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MEDICAID COPAYMENTS: A BITTER PILL
FOR THE POOR
In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act to create Medi-
caid, a Federal grant-in-aid program which allows states to enter into
agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to fund
health care services for public assistance recipients and specific low in-
come individuals and families.' In fiscal year 1980, approximately
twenty-one and a half million individuals were eligible for the Medi-
caid program.2
Since the program's inception as Title XIX of the 1965 Social Se-
curity Act, Medicaid expenditures have risen from $238 million in
19663 to expenditures of $27.6 billion in 1980.4 Projected expenditures
for fiscal year 1982 are expected to spiral to $32.6 billion with the states
paying approximately forty percent of this amount.5 If this trend con-
tinues, federal health care, of which Medicaid and Medicare6 constitute
the bulk, will rise to $236 billion by 1990. 7
The spiraling costs of the Medicaid program have placed a severe
fiscal strain upon both federal and state governments. On the federal
level, the rising cost of Medicaid seriously threatens any possible bal-
ancing of the federal budget. At the state level, these rising costs im-
pose a severe fiscal strain upon state budgets. Because Medicaid
represents the most rapidly rising cost in most state budgets, many
states have found it necessary to curtail other important state expendi-
tures to maintain their Medicaid program.8
1. Subchapter XIX-Grants To States for Medical Assistance Programs
§ 1396. Authorization of appropriations
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions
in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent
children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and
other services to help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for in-
dependence or self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal
year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made
available under this section shall be used for making payments to which have submit-
ted, and had approved by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, State
plans for medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
2. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH CARE FINANCING PROGRAM STATIS-
TICS, Table 1.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HCFA STATISTICS].
3. Medicare and Medicaid- Problems, Issues, andAiternatives, Hearings Before Senate Commit-
tee on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Medicare andMedicaid].
4. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 1982, at 43, col. 3.
5. Id.
6. Medicare covers hospital, physician and other medical services for: individuals aged 65 and
older, disabled persons entitled to social security cash benefits for four consecutive months;
and most persons with end-stage renal disease. Medicare is divided into two parts, Hospital
Insurance known as part A and Supplementary Medical Insurance known as part B. HCFA
STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 1 (1981).
7. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 1982, at 43, Col. 3.
8. Michigan, for example, has made enormous sacrifices to maintain their Medicaid program.
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This note focuses upon one method states often employ in their at-
tempt to reduce Medicaid costs: the imposition of a cost-sharing re-
quirement, commonly known as copayments. Copayments embody the
conflict between the need for essential medical services for the indigent
and the need for state fiscal integrity. This note discusses how copay-
ments are an inadequate and inappropriate tool for budgetary restraint.
Copayments increase rather than decrease state Medicaid expenditures
and deprive Medicaid recipients of needed medical services. This note
discusses effective alternatives some states have implemented to
achieve fiscal integrity while retaining necessary medical programs for
the indigent.
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW
In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act of 1935 to in-
clude grants to states for medical assistance programs.9 Unlike Medi-
care which is available as a matter of right to all individuals paying
Social Security taxes,'" Medicaid focuses upon specific low income
groups. The report of the Committee on Ways and Means notes
a state [Medicaid] plan to be approved must include provisions for
medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or assistance under
state plans approved under Titles I, IV, IX, XIV and XVI [of the Social
Security Act]. The people who are eligible for assistance under these
titles are the most needy and it is appropriate for medical care costs to
be met first for these people."
It is only if this group is provided for that states may include medical
assistance to the less needy.
Medicaid is a program of matching funds for state plans approved
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 2 Federal funds are
available contingent upon the state's per capita income and range from
50 to 77.5% of the state program costs. All states, the District of Co-
lumbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Northern Marianas participate in
Over a period of the last ten years, the Medicaid share of the Michigan budget has increased
from 7 to 12% and the public welfare share of the Michigan budget has increased from 12 to
20%. Concomitantly, other areas have experienced severe cuts to make up for the increased
Medicaid expenses. The Education share of the Michigan budget dropped from 52 to 38%
and in the last six months, the education budget was cut by one hundred million dollars to
pay for health and welfare needs. Paul Allen, director of the Michigan Medicaid program
notes: This is a real manifestation of the fact that health and welfare are eating up more state
dollars. The dollars have got to come from someplace so they're coming from these other
programs. Ironically, Michigan's Medicaid program is recognized as one of the best run in
the nation and offers a comprehensive list of services. Demkovich, For State Squeezed by
Medicaid Costs, the Worst Crunch is Still to Come, NAT'L J., Jan. 10, 1981, at 48.
9. Social Security Act of 1965, Pub.L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 437(1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (1976)).
10. HCFA STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 1.
11. H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
AD. NEWS 2017.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1974). When the author uses the term matching funds, the author refers to
federal financial participation in the Medicaid program. Federal expenditures vary with the
state's per capita income and currently range from 50% to 77.55% of program medical ex-
penditures. HCFA STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 2.
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the Medicaid program. 13
Medicaid is a program of statutory provisions and HHS regulations
of labyrinthine complexity.14 State programs differ substantially in eli-
gibility criteria and services provided. This results from the Congres-
sional desire to provide'states with flexibility in the design and
implementation of their programs.'" Additionally, since the federal
government pays a substantial portion of state Medicaid costs, state
Medicaid programs are subject to substantial federal regulation, partic-
ularly regarding the curtailment of services.' 6
Federal regulations mandate that a state program must provide
medical assistance to specific groups of individuals.' 7 At a minimum,
the state program must offer medical assistance to the categorically
needy.' 8 Those individuals who are eligible for cash assistance under
AFDC, or who are needy, blind, or disabled individuals, and meet the
income and resource levels are eligible in most states for supplemental
security income. 19
States may extend Medicaid to the medically needy,20 an option
that permits states to cover individuals who meet all criteria, except
income, for categorically needy assistance, and who have substantial
medical bills.2' Federal regulations allow states to include a spend-
down provision to cover individuals who do not meet the categorically
needy income levels but whose medical bills effectively reduce their
income to the categorically needy threshold.22
Federal regulations require that state Medicaid programs provide
the following services to the categorically needy: In- and Out-patient
hospital services, rural health clinic services, other laboratory and X-
ray services, skilled nursing facility services for individuals age twenty-
one or older, early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment,
family planning services and supplies, physician services and home
health services.23 Additionally, states may offer a comprehensive list of
13. Id Arizona which has never had a Medicaid program opted to participate as of October 1,
1982.
14. Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1976).
15. States have great flexibility in determining eligibility, services and the scope of services
within the federal guidelines. Courts have traditionally been very respectful of this flex-
ibility. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
16. States will often attempt to implement cutbacks without following federal notice require-
ments. The courts respond by enjoining the cutbacks until the notice provisions are properly
complied with. See Claus v. Smith, 519 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Kimble v. Solomon
599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp.324 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1-.1011 (1979).
18. 42 C.F.R § 435.100-.135 (1979)
19. Id.
20. 42 C.F.R. § 435.300-325 (1979). Financial eligibility for the medically needy varies from
program to program ranging from a high of $6,552 per year in Hawaii to a low of $1,512 per
year in Puerto Rico for a family of four. HCFA STATISTICS, supra note 2, Table 4.2.
21. 42 C.F.R. § 435.300-325 (1979). See also HCFA STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 65.
22. State programs often provide Medicaid coverage to other needy groups, such as individuals
eligible for a state welfare program. However, federal funds are not available to cover these
individuals.
23. 42 C.F.R. § 440.210 (1979).
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services to both the categorically and the medically needy for which
federal funds will be available.24
Congress recently amended the Social Security Act to allow states
substantially more freedom in the services provided to the medically
needy.2 The new regulations enable a state to offer services to the
medically needy without being bound by requirements as to a mini-
mum number of services, or a mix of institutional and non-institutional
services. States may offer services to one group of individuals (e.g., the
elderly) without being required to offer comparable services to other
groups. The intent of the 1981 amendments is to provide states with
flexibility in establishing the eligibility criteria and the scope of services
provided under the medically needy program.26 This allows states to
fine-tune their medically needy programs according to the needs of dif-
ferent population groups. 27
In addition to specific medical service requirements, federal regula-
tions mandate the degree and scope of services that must be provided.
Adequate transportation to and from providers must be provided.28
Each service under the state plan must be sufficient in amount, dura-
tion, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose.29 Services may not
be denied, reduced in amount or scope merely because of the diagnosis,
24. Federal regulations provide that the state may make available a broad range of services:
a) Inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental
disease) and rural health clinic services; b) Outpatient hospital services; c) Other laboratory
and X-ray services; d) Skilled nursing facility services; e) Early and periodic screening, diag-
nosis and treatment (ESPDT); f) Family planning services; g) Physician's services;
h) Medical care or other remedial care recognized by state law and furnished by licensed
practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by state law; i) Home health care
services; j) Private duty nursing services; k) Clinic services; 1) Dental services; m) Physical
therapy, related services; n) Prescribed drugs, dentures and prosthetic devices and eyeglasses
prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye; o) Any other diagnostic, screening,
preventive and rehabilitative services; p) Inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility
services and intermediate care facilities for individuals 65 years or older in an institution for
tuberculosis or mental diseases; q) Intermediate care facility services (other than institutional
services for mental disease or tuberculosis) for individuals who are determined. . .to be in
need of such care; r) Inpatient psychiatric hospital services for individuals under age 21...;
s) Any other medical care and any other type of remedial care recognized under state law
specified by the secretary. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (1976).
25. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-35, §§ 2171-2172, 95 Stat. 357
(1981). Previously, state plans providing services to the medically needy had to insure that
the state program offered the mandatory services for the categorically needy, or any seven of
the medical services offered under the Medicaid program. If the state plan opted to cover
inpatient hospital services or skilled nursing facility services, physician services for individu-
als undergoing such treatment had to be included. 42 C.F.R. § 440 (1979).
26. Summary of Finance Committee Recommendations, Social Security Provisions in S. REP. No.
139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 427, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 396, 697-
98.
27. Congress did however establish specific restrictions. A state which does offer medically
needy services must provide ambulatory services to children and prenatal and delivery serv-
ices for pregnant women. Where a state provides institutional services for any medically
needy group, it must provide ambulatory services for the same. Finally, if the state Medicaid
program covers mentally retarded in intermediate care facilities, it must provide all services
required prior to the 1981 amendment to medically needy individuals. See supra, note 24.
28. 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (1979). Provider means any individual or entity furnishing Medicaid
services under a provider agreement with a Medicaid agency 42 C.F.R. § 430.1 (1979).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1979).
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type of illness, or condition. °
States may implement, however, appropriate limitations based
upon criteria of medical necessity or to control overutilization of medi-
cal services. States use this provision to reduce the scope of services
they must provide, by often limiting the number of days that a state
will reimburse inpatient hospital care.3' The differences in state eligi-
bility requirements and the scope of services offered produces substan-
tial variation among state Medicaid programs.
The Medicaid Crisis
When Congress considered implementing the Medicaid program,
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 32 estimated that
Medicaid would cost the government $238 million dollars in its first
year of operation 3 Current expenditures will reach $32.6 billion.34
This spiraling cost has created what will be referred to as the Medicaid
crisis .
From 1967 to 1976, the Medicaid program grew rapidly. HEW esti-
mated that program costs for the first year of operation would be $238
million.36 The entire $238 million was spent, but only by six states
which were able to implement a Medicaid program in that year.3 7 The
budget the President submitted to Congress in 1967 allocated $2.25 bil-
lion as the federal share for forty-eight state Medicaid programs. 8 In
actuality, only thirty-seven states were able to implement Medicaid
programs, at a cost exceeding $3.54 billion.39 The number of recipients
doubled from 11.5 million in 1967 to almost 23 million in 1977.40
From 1977 to the present, slowing growth and substantial changes
in the coverage of recipients has characterized the Medicaid Program.
Since 1977, when the program reached the highwater mark of its en-
30. Id
31. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1979) is interesting in this regard. Medicaid recipients brought an
action challenging the denial of coverage for non-therapeutic abortions. The Supreme Court
noted that nothing in the Medicaid statute suggests that states are required to fund every
medical procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical care. The Court
noted that states were given broad discretion in determining the extent of medical care, pro-
viding that assistance be "reasonable" and "consistent with the objectives of the Act." Beal,
432 U.S. at 444. See also S. DAVIDSON & T. MARMOR, THE COST OF LIVING LONGER
(1980).
32. Now known as the Department of Health and Human Services.
33. Medicare and Medicaid, supra note 3, at 42.
34. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 1982, at 43, col. 3.
35. An analysis of private sector health costs indicates that the spiraling cost of Medicaid is
symptomatic of the health care industry in general. Hospital costs have soared from $3.9
billion in 1950 to $76 billion in 1978, an average annual increase of 11.2%. Nursing home
expenditures have risen at an annual rate of 17.2%. While the consumer price index rose
87% for all items from 1970-1979, medical care service charges rose 200% over the same
period. DEP'T OF HEW, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 181 (1979).
36. Medicare and Medicaid, supra note 3, at 42.
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id
40. HCFA STATIsTiCs, supra note 2, at Table 2.1.
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rollment,4 ' the number of recipients has declined at an annual rate of
3.1%. Medicaid costs have continued to spiral, however, from
$16,277,000 in 1977 to $20,474,000 in 1979 despite 1.5 million fewer
recipients.42
Medicaid's increasing coverage of long term institutional care and
state fiscal difficulties account for the Medicaid crisis. As of 1979,
42.3% of Medicaid reimbursements covered nursing home costs while
an additional 31.4% of Medicaid reimbursements covered hospitaliza-
tion costs.43 In sum, 73.7% of the Medicaid budget was spent on insti-
tutional care. The increase in aged and disabled individuals on
Medicaid and a reduction in the coverage of children reflects the in-
creasing institutionalization of Medicaid. Institutional care represents
the costliest sector of health care. Because other medical services cov-
ered by Medicaid have leveled off, or grown slowly, Medicaid now
predominantly covers institutional care.
State fiscal difficulties compound this problem. In times of reces-
sion, less revenue is available to states from state and federal coffers.
Concomitant with decreased revenues is an increasing demand upon
state welfare services by the seasonally and permanently unemployed.
As Medicaid program costs outgrow available state revenues and as the
federal government reduces matching funds, state budgets become in-
creasingly burdened.
States have several options available to reduce the budgetary strains
from spiraling Medicaid costs:
(1) increase revenues to pay for the rising costs of Medical services;
(2) reduce fraud and administrative costs while increasing third party
collection efforts;
(3) increase the scope of the state Medicaid program to include federal
matching funds for services which were previously only provided by
the state;
(4) reduce certain services by controlling rates, supervising utilization,
tightening eligibility requirements, or increasing the recipient's out of
pocket expenses.
This note focuses upon the last option: the imposition of a cost
sharing requirement (otherwise known as a copayment) which man-
dates that recipients pay part of the cost of their medication.'
41. Id In 1978, this figure dropped by 700,000 to 22,197,000 and the following year, fell to
21,540,000.
42. Id Table 2.9.
43. Id Figure 1.1.
44. Currently, the following states have copayments: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S ASSOCIATION, CATALOGUE OF STATE PRO-
GRAM CHANGES: SPRING 1982 UPDATE XX-XXI (May 1982).
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COPAYMENTS
Federal regulations permit a state Medicaid program to require the
Medicaid recipient to pay a nominal portion of the cost of the service
prior to receiving it.4" The provider then bills the state for the cost of
the service less the copayment paid by the recipient. Theoretically this
reduces state Medicaid costs in two respects. First Medicaid costs are
reduced by the amount of the copayment. However, this reduction is
minimal due to federal regulations which restrict copayments to a nom-
inal charge per service.46 Second, states hope to instill a cost conscious-
ness in Medicaid recipients and thereby deter unnecessary utilization of
services. To do this, states require that recipients bear part of their
medication costs.
Specific limitations upon the use of copayments existed under pre-
vious law. Copayments could not be imposed upon mandatory services
which must be made available to the categorically needy. However,
copayments could be imposed on any other service offered to the cate-
gorically needy.4' Copayments also could be imposed upon any service
offered to the medically needy.48 Copayments are computed on the ba-
sis of the cost of the service rather than the income of the recipient and
must be nominal in amount.49
Section 131 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
substantially changes the present federal regulations to expand the
scope of copayments.50 Pursuant to this new law, states may impose
nominal copayments on all Medicaid recipients, including the categori-
cally needy. Congress specifically exempted certain services from these
copayment requirements, including services furnished to individuals
under eighteen years of age, services furnished to pregnant women (if
such service relates to the pregnancy), and services furnished to inpa-
tients in a medical institution where the inpatient receives a personal
45. The pertinent federal regulations provide: Any copayment it [the state Medicaid agency]
imposes may not exceed the amounts shown in the following table:
State Payment Maximum Copayment Chargeable
For the Service to the Recipient
$10 or less $ .50
$11 to 25 $1.00
$26 to 50 $2.00
$51 or more $3.00
42 C.F.R. § 447.54 (3) (1979).
46. The scope and cost of Medicaid copyaments may be increased if the state acquires a waiver
from the Secretary of HHS. The Secretary of HHS may waive compliance with any of the
requirements of Medicaid if the experimental, pilot or demonstration project is likely to as-
sist in promoting the objectives of the Social Security Act. 42 C.F.R. § 1315 (1974).
47. Mandatory services are: in and out-patient hospital services, rural health clinic services,
other laboratory and X-ray services, skilled nursing facility services for individuals under age
21, family planning services and supplies for individuals of child bearing age, physician's
services and home health care services. 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (1979).
48. 42 C.F.R. § 447.53(b) (1979).
49. 42 C.F.R. § 447.54(3) (1979).
50. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 131, 96 Stat. 324
(1982).
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needs allowance and emergency services." The law also provides that
the secretary is to promulgate regulations to determine "nominal in
amount,"52 but if an individual is unable to pay the nominal copay-
ment, the provider of medical services may not deny services.5 3 The
Conference Committee estimates that this provision will reduce federal
Medicaid costs by forty-two million dollars, presumably in reduced
utilization of medical services. 54
The Legislative History of Copayments
Copayments were originally permitted on all services, with the ex-
ception of inpatient hospitalization that are available under Medicaid,
provided that the copayment was reasonably related to the recipient's
income.55 In 1972, copayments attained their present form after a con-
ffict between the Senate and the House of Representatives. The House
was deeply concerned with the escalating costs of Medicaid and pro-
posed copayments as a cost reduction tool.56 The Senate was more
concerned with the accessibility of the poor to medical services. 7 After
the conference committee, copayments attained their present "nominal
form." 5 8
The 1972 amendments authorized the Secretary of HEW to imple-
ment standards insuring that copayments would in fact be nominal.
The secretary promulgated a flat fee dependent upon the cost of the
medical service provided. However, the flat fee violates Congressional
intent. Under the regulations, the copayment is nominal only with re-
spect to the cost of the service provided, not the income of the recipi-
51. Id § 131(b)(2)(A), (B), (C) & (D). See also id § 131(b)(2)(b)(2)(A), (B), (C) & (D).
52. Id § 131(b)(3).
53. Id § 131(c).
54. Ultimately, the Senate Finance Committee estimated this provision would save $142 million
by 1985. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. vol.1 reprintedin September 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND AD. NEWS 7.
55. Copayments were not permitted for inpatient hospitalization. Social Security Act of 1965,
§ 1902(a)(14) (1965).
56. Your committee [on Ways and Means] has been concerned that costs of the Medicaid
program have been escalating much more rapidly than had been anticipated and be-
lieves that an element of cost-consciousness on the part of patients and physicians
should be introduced into the program as a cost control device.
H.R. REP. No. 231, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 73, 74 (1972).
57. The committee [on Finance] does not intend them (copayments) to apply to inpatient
hospital services, skilled nursing home care or other similar services where the practi-
tioner determines utilization, use of the services, such as initial office visits to physi-
cians and dentists for routine care. With respect to those services for which the
practitioner in the main determines utilization the committee expects that the major
control of utilization will occur through professional review mechanism. . .Limiting
copayments and deductibles for the medically needy is only compatible with the com-
mittee's belief that such cost-sharing devices in the Medicaid program should not im-
pose such a financial hardship on the recipient that he is hesitant to seek needed
medical services when ill.
S. REP. No. 1230, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 219, 220 (1972).
58. 42 C.F.R. § 447.54 (1979).
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ent.59 It is possible, indeed common, for a recipient to be charged
nominal copayments but to require so many services as to have a
copayment bill which is far from nominal.6" In testimony before the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, the Director of the Na-
tional Health Law Program cited several case studies illustrating this
problem. For example,
A San Francisco woman ... at the time of the California copayment
experiment had been recently hospitalized with malnutrition. In addi-
tion, she had suffered emotional problems requiring psychiatric care.
Her small VA benefit was supplemented by categorical assistance up to
the cash maximum, and she received Medicaid. She could not afford
to meet her desperate need for improved food and still pay the $1
copayment for each of several physicians visits she truly needed. She
lived in dread of emergencies, unable to meet the copayment.6'
Unfortunately, cases such as these are not unique.62 Representative
Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) perhaps summarized best the effect of copay-
ments upon the poor when he noted:
For the elderly poor, a fifty cent copayment which seems insignificant
to most of us can mean the difference between a needed perscription,
and a quart of milk or a loaf of bread. What right do we have to ask
them to make this choice? There are people living in or approximate
to my district who have to make the choice every day between a cup of
coffee and morning newspaper.63
Middle-class taxpayers, who bear the burden of social welfare pro-
grams' heavy costs, are well in accord with copayments. 64 If Medicaid
59. Chavkin and Cypen, Cost-Sharing Under Medicaid, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 287 (1978).
The flat fee is merely a charge per service. See supra note 45.
60. While the federal regulations permit states to establish a cumulative maximum on the
amount they may charge in copayments, few, if any, have chosen to do so. 42 C.F.R.
§ 447.54 (1980).
61. Hearings on H.A 7028, 7029, 7030, 7031 and 7468 Re/ore the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (testimony of the Director of the National Health
Law Program) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of NHLP].
62. In Claus v. Smith, 519 F.Supp. 829 (N.D.Ind.1981), an action brought by the Legal Services
Program of Northern Indiana to enjoin a copayment program instituted in Indiana, the
plaintiffs submitted affidavits detailing their financial status. One of the representative plain-
tiffs required 25 prescriptions of $10.00 or less, 12 prescriptions between $10 and $25, and
four bills for physical therapy $50.00 or more. She also required transportation for her phys-
ical therapy. Her copayment bill for the above would be $45.50. For a woman on a very
limited income, this is far from nominal although it is nominal per service. The other repre-
sentative plaintiffs in Claus suffered from similar limited resources and high medical bills.
63. HousE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, H.R. Doc. No. 181, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (Comm.
Print 1979) (statement of Rep. Claude D. Pepper, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Health &
Long-Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging).
64. In general, cost-sharing is sensible in health programs, particularly as applied to the middle
class and individuals who can afford the copayment. Copayments do not work well as ap-
plied to poverty level groups. Poverty level individuals have little if any discretionary in-
come and may be forced to choose between food and medication. But, copayments are a
very powerful and attractive political argument: they allow states to retain many services yet
appear cost-conscious to the taxpayer. As a general rule, we readily accept the philosophy
that it is only just that an individual contribute what he can towards his own care. Tele-
hone interview with Gerald Riley, Head of the Washington State Medicaid Program (Aug.
r, 1982).
222 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 10:213
recipients require services, they will be available to them, but recipients
will be expected to contribute towards the cost of any services. Copay-
ments therefore permit a state to appear compassionate towards the in-
digent yet cost conscious to the taxpayer.
In practice, however, copayments have been found to be expensive
and difficult to administer.65 New York, for example, implemented a
copayment program in 1969 which it later terminated because it be-
came an administrative nightmare. Health care providers often con-
front the difficult choice of turning away recipients in need of medical
services because they cannot afford copayments, absorbing the copay-
ment thus rendering their participation less lucrative, or ultimately
passing the copayment on to the public in terms of higher medical
costs.
6 6
Dr. Milton Roemer suggests that copayments may ultimately cost a
state substantially more than is saved.67 Dr. Roemer received a grant
from HEW to examine the effects of a California copayment plan upon
the utilization rate by Medicaid recipients.68 Dr. Roemer discovered
that copayments were "penny-wise and pound foolish" because they
inhibit medical care whether it is advisable or not.69 While use of am-
bulatory care services by the copayment group decreased, the use of the
65. BLOOMSBERG STUDY, A POSITION PAPER ON COPAYMENTS 4 (1976). A private study pre-
pared for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts when it was considering the implementation
of copayments in its Medicaid program.
66. Three basic problems states implementing copayments face are administrative costs, reduc-
tion in the number of providers because copayments impose an additional burden on them,
both in terms of administration, as well as financially, and ultimately increased costs to the
state from the first two. Additionally, states must implement provisions to insure that indi-
viduals who are unable to afford copayments still receive services. The alternative is to turn
an individual away in desperate need of medication, possibly to die. For example, a poor
couple in San Antonio recently sought admission to a clinic for the wife's complaints of
coughing and congestion. Unable to pay the facility's three dollar charge (the husband only
had 180 in his pocket) they were turned away. Two days later, the wife died of double
pneumonia. Testimony of NHLP, supra note 61, at 6.
67. Dr. Milton Roemer teaches at the University of California at Los Angeles, School of Public
Health. Dr. Roemer examined utilization rates of medical care by Medicaid recipients six
months prior to the implementation of copayments and 12 months afterwards. M. Roemer,
C. Hopkins and F. Gartside, Copayments/orAmbulatory Care: Penny-WIise andPound-Fool-
ish, 13 MEDICAL CARE 457 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Roemer].
68. California implemented a copayment plan requiring Medicaid recipients to pay one dollar
for the first two visits to a physician and 50¢ for the first two drug prescriptions per month.
See generally California Welfare Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
69. "These findings suggest that the effect of copayment requirements for ambulatory services
(and prescriptions) in a medical care environment for low income families were [sic] to exert
a deterrent effect on demand or utilization. The inhibiting effect applied to office visits, -
the bedrock of general medical care - and also to typical diagnostic tests (urinalysis), to
preventive procedures (Pap Smears), and to drug prescriptions. Easy access to and use of
general ambulatory services are widely considered to have preventive value by permittingprompt diagnosis and treatment of an illness before it becomes more serious ... .These find-
ings also have serious financial implications. Hospitalization is by far the costliest sector of
medical care. A reduced rate of ambulatory care may yield short-term financial savings, but
a subsequent increase in the rate of hospital use could more than outweigh these amounts."Roemer, upra note 67, at 464, 465. Note that Roemer's study reaffirms t e concerns of the
U.S. Senate Committee. Copayments do in fact inhibit preventive care and effectively deterindividuals from seeking medical assistance until their illness has become aggravated.
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more expensive non-ambulatory services increased, more than offset-
ting any savings gained through lower ambulatory cost.70 Roemer esti-
mated that copayments ultimately cost the state of California an extra
$1.2 million.
The Rand Corporation has produced two studies concerning copay-
ments. The first study reexamined the findings of Roemer, utilized the
same data, but evaluated it through different statistical methods.7 This
study verified Roemer's findings and noted that "copayments for am-
bulatory services in a welfare population as a means of controlling
costs may well be ineffectual or even self defeating. 73 In 1981, the
Rand Corporation reported the interim results of a controlled study
examining the effects of copayments on utilization of medical serv-
ices.74 The Rand study clearly contradicted Roemer's findings and spe-
cifically found that cost-sharing reduces medical utilization, without a
concomitant increase in institutional or non-ambulatory care costs.7 5
Despite the scientific accuracy of the 1981 Rand study, several fac-
tors suggest that it is inapplicable to cost-sharing among Medicaid re-
cipients. First, only five percent of the individuals in the Rand study
were Medicaid recipients.76 The average income of participants varied
from a high of $11,800 in Seattle to a low of $6,400 in Georgetown
County, South Carolina.77 Second, the study specifically excluded in-
dividuals sixty-two years or older. 8 Such individuals constitute at least
70. Ambulatory care is outpatient care. It refers to patients whose illness does not necessitate the
atient being confined to bed. J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND
O1RD FINDER, vol. I, at A143 (1982). Ambulatory care includes such things as physicians's
visits, prescriptions and most preventive care etc. Non-ambulatory care is basically institu-
tional care. Non-ambulatory care is far more expensive than ambulatory, and where alter-
nate treatment is available, one ambulatory, one-non-ambulatory, the ambulatory care is
generally the most cost efficient.
71. Roemer, supra note 67, at 465.
72. L. HELMS, J. NEWHOUSE, C. PHELPS, COPAYMENTS AND DEMAND FOR MEDICAL CARE: THE
CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE (1978).
73. Id at vi.
74. "Conditional upon the validity of our assumptions, our results indicate that strong price
effects may be at work in the welfare population. Requiring a one dollar copayment for
physician's visits decreased the demand for physicians services by eight percent but increased
the demand for hospital impatient services by 17%. And while the confidence interval islarge. ..... point estimates indicate that where was a three percent to eigat percent increase in
overall rogram cost. Thus copayments for ambulatory services in a welfare population as a
means of controlling costs may well be ineffectual or even self defeating". Id/ at 16. Roe-ers study was not in fact a scientifically accurate study and hence hasbeen impeached onthose grounds. The Medicaid control groups were not randomly chosen and were not
matched. Immediately prior to the Roemer study, California had implemented prior author-
ization requirements which lowered the demand for certain services, and may have distorted
the results. Likewise, the two copayment groups were not exactly alike and differed in sev-
eral major respects. The initial Rand study reaffirms the Roemer results - but is conditional
upon the accuracy of the samples.
75. J. NEWHOUSE, W. MANNIN, C. MORRIS, SOME INTERIM RESULTS FROM A CONTROLLED
TRI.AL OF COST SHARING IN HEALTH INSURANCE (1981) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM RE-SULTS]. Unlike the Roemer study, the Rand study scientifically selected 7,706 participants in
si sixtes aross the ountry and was statistically designed to be accurate.
76. Telephone interview with Joseph Newhouse, one of the authors of the interim report (Aug.
19, 1982).77. INTERIM RESULTS, supra note 75, Table 1.
78. Id at 4. The Rand study found that as cost-sharing declines, more individuals seeking care
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15.6% of Medicaid recipients and, as retired individuals, may not have
the discretionary income with which to pay copayments. Third, be-
cause the Rand study reimbursed individuals for cost-sharing, no one
lost money by participating in the program.79 However, Medicaid re-
cipients are not reimbursed for copayment costs. If an individual can-
not afford the copayment, he doesn't receive the service. Fourth, and
most important, the Rand study does not purport to study the effect
copayments have upon the individual's health. Roemer's study
strongly indicates that copayments exact a demanding cost upon an in-
dividual's health. The Rand study is accurate only for what it purports
to study: cost-sharing in the general population, rather than the Medi-
caid population. 0
Copayments are designed to deter Medicaid recipients from overu-
tilizing medical services. Little evidence exists however to demonstrate
that Medicaid recipients overutilize medical services. Dr. Karen Davis
of the Department of Health and Human Services, noted in a hearing
before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment that:
the poor in fact receive fewer health services than they need. There is
little evidence at present that the poor in general overutilize health care
services. The poor in every age group are less likely to have seen a
physician during the past year than the nonpoor. Medicaid benefi-
ciaries specifically show little evidence of overutilization .... [m]ore
importantly it appears that low income Americans may actually re-
ceive fewer health services than they require. The poor continue to be
less healthy than the nonpoor. If health services were used according
to need, then the poor would use more services than the nonpoor. In
fact, the poor receive fewer services than more affluent people of com-
parable health status.8 '
In most instances, physicians, not recipients, determine the level of
medical service utilization. As of 1980, physician decisions on behalf
of patients were responsible for $154 billion in medical expenditures."2
To the extent that physicians determine utilization, copayments on
such services will be ineffective, or alternatively, will result in recipients
failing to receive needed medical attention because they cannot afford
the copayment.
rise and the number of ambulatory visits per user increases. The study also found that cost
sharing for ambulatory services decreases hospital admission among adults. The summary
of the report notes, "Cost sharing unambiguously reduces expenditures; it is not pennywise
and pound foolish." Id at v, vi.
79. Id at 8. A family always gained financially by joining.
80. Interview with Newhouse, supra note 76. Mr. Newhouse feels that despite the low Medicaid
participation in the study, the study is applicable to copayments among Medicaid recipients.
Hie points in particular to the fact that the response of the lowest third and the highest third
of the income distribution are similar.
81. Hearings on HR 7028, 7029, 7030, 7031 and 7468 Before the Subcomna on Health and the
Environment, 97th Cong. Ist Sess. 8 (1980) (Statement of Karen Davis, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health and Human Services).
82. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE
291 (1981).
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Copayments infringe upon Medicaid recipients with little or no dis-
cretionary income, with their effect falling most heavily upon large
families, the chronically ill, and the elderly.83 Copayments deter neces-
sary as well as unnecessary services. Finally, copayments often result
in the selective use of medical services. Many Medicaid recipients, par-
ticularly the chronically ill and the elderly require a large number of
medications and therapeutic services. Copayments often force recipi-
ents to choose among needed services. Ultimately, individuals may ig-
nore certain prescriptions resulting in the worsening of their medical
condition, or possible death. 4
ALTERNATIVES TO COPAYMENTS
There are many cost effective alternatives to copayments which
states may implement to reduce Medicaid costs. These alternatives in-
clude lock-ins, second opinions, fiscal control of institutional care, pre-
admission screening, and competitive bidding. These alternatives focus
on making the Medicaid program more cost efficient, rather than deter-
ing necessary utilization of medical services. Because state programs
differ substantially, not every solution will be applicable to every state.
Nor will one solution be sufficient to completely resolve state fiscal dif-
ficulties. Each state must implement a combination of different pro-
grams to render their respective Medicaid programs more effectively.
Lock-ins
States concerned that certain recipients are overutilizing drugs, out-
patient departments, or other services may lock a recipient into a spe-
cific physician or pharmacist.8 " The recipient will then only receive
medical services from the specific physician or pharmacist he is locked
into. This effectively precludes the recipient from doctor shopping and
83. Copayments produce a more drastic curtailment of medical services for the poor than for
other groups. Copayments implemented in Canada resulted in a seven percent reduction for
the general population, but an 18% reduction in the use of physician's services by the poor.
Beck, The Effect of Copayment on the Poor, J. HUMAN RESOURCES, Vol. IV, No. 1, at 140.
84. "Studies done in California on selective drug use indicated that after copayments were insti-
tuted, 28% of the pharmacy respondents in the California experiment indicated that Medi-
caid recipients were selectively filling their prescriptions. Drug use may conceivably result in
death. Patients suffering from hypertension are often treated with diuretics which have the
effect of reducing the volume of the blood and increasing the kidney output. Unfortunately,
electrolyte imbalance may also occur. If this electrolyte imbalance continues unchecked,
severe consequences may result including tachycardi and cardia arrythmia which can lead to
death, particularly in elderly individuals. The possibility of these side effects would ordina-
rily be guarded against by prescribing an electrolyte such as potassium chloride. A Medicaid
recipient, discouraged from utilizing services by the introduction of cost-sharing might
choose to fill the prescription only for the diuretic, thereby unwittingly inviting the possiblity
of further illness or death. The specter of selective filling of prescriptions is more than a
mere possibility." Chavkin and Cypen, Cost Sharing Under Medicaid, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 288 (1978).
85. As of Spring, 1982, 35 states had implemented some type of a lock-in procedure, whether on
a demonstration basis, on certain procedures, services or recipient categories, or as a full
fledged program. NATIONAL GOVERNOR's ASSOCIATION, CATALOGUE OF STATE MEDICAID
PROGRAM CHANGES p. xix (1982).
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eliminates the recipient's ability to purchase excess quantities of drugs.
The Medicare Management Information System makes lock-in possi-
ble through computer monitoring by the states of the utilization of
medical services by specific recipients.86
The Missouri lock-in program is exemplary, both in terms of fiscal
integrity and protection of recipients' medical needs. In Missouri, the
Medicaid Management Information System first identifies individuals
who overutilize services." The state Medicaid agency then reviews the
medical history of the recipient to determine if the usage was justified,
examines the provider's history, and ultimately contacts the recipient's
caseworker to gather other information which might explain the pat-
tern of overutilization. Unjustified usage results in a special notation
on the Medical Identification card which locks a recipient into one pro-
vider. Services subsequently provided by other providers will not be
paid for by the state. Missouri has locked in approximately 6,000 re-
cipients with savings of $1.82 million per year.88
Lock-ins may also apply to providers whom the state feels dispense
excessive service.89 Lock-in programs specifically identify and place
stringent controls upon individuals who overutilize Medicaid services
yet do not limit the utilization of necessary care. The lock-in program
clearly presents a viable alternative to copayments.
Second Opinions
States compelled to reduce unnecessary utilization may want to re-
quire Medicaid recipients to obtain a second opinion before certain
types of elective surgery. Recently Michigan and Massachusetts imple-
mented programs requiring a second consultation prior to elective sur-
gery. Both states report a twenty percent reduction in the types of
elective surgery required. 90 States may easily implement the second
consultation program and recognize substantial savings9 in terms of
86. The Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977 established stan-
dards that states must meet for the processing of claims and administrative accountability.
To meet these standards, states must establish sophisticated computerized information sys-
tems. The prototype of these information systems is the Medicaid Management Information
System (MMIS). Chavkin, An Introduction to the Medicaid Management Information System
(MMIS) or Your Friend the Computer, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 99 (1978).
87. MMIS identifies those individuals who in one calendar quarter use four or more different
physicians, 75 or more physician or other professional services, four or more pharmacists, 75
or more prescriptions or two or more hospitals for inpatient care. B. SPITZ, STATE GUIDE TO
MEDICAID COST CONTAINMENT 31 [hereinafter cited as STATE GUIDE].
88. Id
89. Thus effectively permitting a state to limit overutilization of Medicaid services due to provid-
ers. The medical care provider can greatly profit by providing elaborate health care; in gen-
eral, a provider gets little or nothing for keeping people well. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE 353 (1981) (Supplementary
statement on Medicare/Medicaid by Ms. Duskin and Ms. Miller).
90. A second opinion is much less expensive than surgery, nonetheless, second consultations will
generally only be effective in those areas where high rates for nonconfirmation may be ex-
pected. STATE GUIDE, supra note 87, at 27.
91. Currently seven states require a second opinion for certain procedures. Two states have
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reduced unnecessary care.
Fiscal Control of Institutional Care
Another alternative is for states to focus on the spiraling cost of
institutional care. As previously noted, Medicaid expenditures for in-
stitutional care, the costliest segment of health care in the national
economy, have grown enormously.9"
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 and the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981 contain major provisions designed to help
states reduce the staggering costs of institutional care.93 These Acts
simplify the modification of nursing home reimbursement methods,
permit the reduction of payments for hospitalized patients awaiting
nursing home placement and encourage the development of commu-
nity based long term care service.
Many states have reassessed their institutional care reimbursement
methods in light of spiraling institutional care costs.94 Arkansas, Mis-
souri and Utah have enacted flat rates for nursing home reimburse-
ment. Georgia reduced its inflation factor for nursing home
reimbursement from 12.6% to 4.6%. Minnesota has capped nursing
home cost increases at ten percent for 1982, while Wisconsin has done
so at seven percent. Idaho has sought voluntary reductions of five per-
cent in nursing home costs, while Colorado seeks to pass part of nurs-
ing home costs on to local government.95
Many of these state cutbacks, however, have thrown the increasing
cost of institutional care back upon the provider. This forces the pro-
vider to either absorb the cost as a reduction in profits, or alternatively,
to pass the cost on to other users of institutional care in the general
public. Reduced payments to providers of medical services raises the
specter of reduced quality of services to the recipient. The answer to
the reduction of Medicaid costs lies in reducing spiraling institutional
care costs while retaining adequate services.
The Michigan Medicaid program has been a leader in finding inno-
vative and adequate alternatives to expensive institutional care.96 In
Michigan's Medicaid program, administrative costs last year for the
proposed programs in this area. NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S ASSOCIATION, CATALOGUE OF
STATE MEDICAID PROGRAM CHANGES, xix (1982).
92. Program expenditures are heavily weighted toward institutional service, particularly long
term care. Expenditures for care in nursing homes constitutes 42% of program costs while
inpatient hospital care represents 28%. The remaining 30% goes primarily for physician serv-
ices, outpatient hospital care and medication. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MEDICAID:
CHOICES FOR 1982 AND BEYOND, Xii (1981).
93. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2172, 95 Stat 357 (1981).
94. Twenty-four states have implemented changes in their nursing home reimbursement meth-
ods in 1981 and 1982 to reduce costs. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT,
RECENT OR PROPOSED CHANGES IN STATE MEDICAID CARE 12 (1982).
95. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
AND STATE MEDICAID EXPENDITURES FOR NURSING HOME CARE 12 (1982).
96. Demovich, For States Squeezed by Medicaid Costs, the Worst Crunch is Still to Come, NA'"L
J., Jan. 10, 1981, at 48.
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$1.16 billion budget were only twenty-six million dollars. Michigan
has successfully utilized long term community based care as an effec-
tive alternative to institutional care. Specific programs include home
chore services and adult foster care for persons who would otherwise be
hospitalized. The total enrollment between these two programs totals
4,000 more than the nursing home population. George Allen, director
of the Michigan Medicaid program suggests that these programs ex-
plain why Michigan spends twenty-nine cents per dollar of the Medi-
caid budget on institutional care as opposed to the national average of
forty-five cents per Medicaid dollar.97
Other states have successfully experimented with less expensive al-
ternatives to institutional care. Idaho allows a tax deduction of $1,000
to individuals who maintain immediate relatives aged sixty-five or
older in their home.9" Oklahoma has developed a "Non-Technical
Medical Care in Own Home" where friends and neighbors after train-
ing, assist Medicaid recipients in their home. The program costs the
state much less than institutional care. In Boston, a "life-line" tele-
hone program maintains contact with frail and infirm residents of a
ousing project.99 A Seattle program helps isolated elderly individuals
find someone they can live with to share expenses and provide mutual
support.1°° All of these programs provide vital support to individuals
who might otherwise be institutionalized. Programs such as these re-
duce state institutional care costs.101
Pre-Admission Screening
Pre-admission screening may likewise be used to limit admission to
nursing homes to individuals who truly need institutional care. 0 2 Vir-
ginia has implemented a very effective program in this area.10 3 An in-
terdisciplinary committee of the local health department determines
whether services are available in the community to assist the recipient,
or whether institutionalization is necessary. During the first ten months
of this program, the interdisciplinary committee reviewed 1,755 cases
of which 395 were determined capable of remaining in the community.
This pre-admission screening saved the state $1.6 million." 4 Virginia
has found that approximately twenty-one percent of the individuals
97. Id
98. IDAHO CODE § 63-3022(L)(1)(C) (1982).
99. Protective Services for the Elderly Act of 1977, OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 801-810.
100. See generally STATE GUIDE, supra note 87, at 32.
101. Id
102. However, community based care is not a panacea for institutional care, and cannot replace
institutional care in all circumstances. Some studies indicate that many alternative programs
without specific controls must act as an additional service to a person who would not be
institutionalized anyway. William Weissert, Towards a Continuum of Care for the Elderly:
A Note of Caution, presented at the American Public Health Association's annual meeting in
Detroit, Michigan (October 1980).
103. STATE GUIDE, supra note 87, at 33.
104. Id at 34.
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seeking admission to nursing homes could remain in the community.105
Similarly, pre-admission screening could effectively be used to re-
duce overutilization of hospital emergency room services.
Medicaid recipients in urban areas often rely upon hospital emer-
gency rooms for care which could easily be provided in a less expensive
environment. 10 6  Screening emergency room admissions therefore
would substantially reduce non-emergency room use of these facili-
ties.'0 7 Patients could be referred to clinics and physicians. Alterna-
tively, reimbursing hospitals at lower clinic or physician rates produces
a strong incentive for the hospital to channel non-emergency medical
care to clinics.
Competitive Bidding
Finally, states must not ignore administrative methods which can
substantially reduce Medicaid program costs. For example, federal
regulations require states to seek reimbursement from third parties
where a third party is liable for the medical costs of the recipients.1 8 A
variety of private and other public sources are liable for the medical
costs of the recipients. The failure of state Medicaid programs to dis-
cover and charge these sources for medical services constitutes subsi-
dizing private insurance companies and other public agencies at state
taxpayer expense.' 0 9 Minnesota and North Carolina have imple-
mented effective programs. Minnesota invested $263 thousand in a
third party liability program and recouped $9 million in 1979. l0 North
Carolina's project cost $120 thousand in administrative costs and
recouped $6 million."' Third party reimbursement can be a goldmine
for states attempting to recoup costs.
States likewise can reduce Medicaid costs by utilizing the massive
purchasing power of the state Medicaid program. States can solicit
competitive bids for the use of services and equipment used in the
105. Id
106. Since nursing homes generally are not reimbursed for specific services rendered, but rather
on a per diem basis, there is a strong incentive for nursing homes to admit individuals who
could in fact remain in the community. Id
107. A 1970 assessment of Philadelphia General Hospital revealed that 90% of the emergency
room cases were diagnosed as everyday medical problems such as influenza, gastrointestinal
upset and superficial infection. Id
108. 42 C.F.R. § 433.135 (1980).
109. Typically, private health insurance companies as well as other governmental agencies (work-
men's compensation, Veteran's Administration, Champus) are liable for the health costs of a
recipient.
110. STATE GUIDE, supra note 87, at 48.
111. Maryland has successfully implemented a probate recovery program which has yielded
Maryland three million dollars after an investment of $150,000 in 1979. Federal regulations
clearly encourage states to recoup third party liability. Notions of federalism preclude the
federal goverment from specifically enabling state legislatures to recoup this money. En-
abling legislation is necessary. For example, Minnesota gave the Department of Public Wel-
fare the ights of assignment and subrogation for each client, and prevented private
insurance carriers from writing contracts which terminated or restricted coverage if an indi-
vidual was found eligible for medicaid. STATE GUIDE supra note 87. at 49.
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Medicaid program rather than pay itemized costs for individual serv-
ices rendered under the Medicaid program. At present, competitive
bidding in the purchase of Medicaid supplies and services is limited to
some types of durable medical equipment such as hearing aids."I2 Sev-
eral bills in Congress have considered giving states more power to bid
for services at volume discount rates. The Congressional Budget Office
suggests that expanded competitive bidding could save a state ninty
million dollars immediately, and up to $600 million in the long run." 3
The state of Washington has effectively used competitive bidding
for the bulk purchase of eyeglass lenses. Michigan has duplicated the
Washington effort with anticipated savings of $500 thousand' 14 and is
currently considering utilizing competitive bidding for hearing aids,
laboratory services and drugs.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-one and a half million Americans rely upon Medicaid for
necessary medical services. Because of fiscal strains, both the state and
federal government have considered serious cutbacks in the services of-
fered. Many states have implemented copayments. This deceptively
expedient solution, however, is ultimately an equally bitter pill for the
poor, as well as for state budgets.
Roemer best summarized copayments when he noted "copayments
are penny-wise and pound foolish." There is no quick solution to this
complex problem. The solutions examined in this note: lock-ins, sec-
ond opinions, fiscal control of institutional care, pre-admission screen-
ing and competitive bidding, are far from comprehensive. Any relief
that will come will come not through the implementation of any one
cost reduction program but rather through the implementation of a va-
riety of cost-reduction programs. States can maintain fiscal integrity
while also offering a substantial Medicaid program.
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112. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MEDICAID CHOICES FOR 1982 AND BEYOND 47 (1981).
113. Id
114. STATE GUIDE, supra note 87, at 52.
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